The first edition of Maynard Smith's Evolutionary Genetics (first published in 1989) was welcomed as the first comprehensive introduction to the molecular and population aspects of evolutionary geneti
All living plants and animals, including man, are the modified descendants of one or a few simple living things. A hundred years ago Darwin and Wallace in their theory of natural selection, or the survival of the fittest, explained how evolution could have happened in terms of processes known to take place today. In this book John Maynard Smith describes how their theory has been confirmed, but at the same time transformed, by recent research, and in particular by the discovery of the laws of inheritance. This reissue reprints the third edition of John Maynard Smith's classic account, adding a substantial new introduction covering recent developments. A new foreword, by the author of The Selfish Gene and The Blind Watchmaker, commends the book to a fresh generation of readers.
The question of why organisms reproduce sexually is still a matter of controversy. In this account, Professor Maynard Smith considers the selective forces responsible for the origin and evolution of sexual reproduction and genetic recombination, using quantitative population genetics arguments to support his ideas. The relative importance of individual and group selection processes are also considered. the aim is to give a clear statement of the theoretical issues, and present enough of the evidence to show what kinds of facts are relevant. It is hoped that where crucial evidence is missing, experimentalists and field workers may be encouraged to collect the relevant data. The author does not claim to solve all the problems he raises, but this clear and well-argued account should provide stimulating reading for advanced undergraduate students and research workers in evolutionary theory.
In this 1982 book, the theory of games, first developed to analyse economic behaviour, is modified so that it can be applied to evolving populations. John Maynard Smith's concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy is relevant whenever the best thing for an animal or plant to do depends on what others are doing. The theory leads to testable predictions about the evolution of behaviour, of sex and genetic systems, and of growth and life history patterns. This book contains a full account of the theory, and of the data relevant to it. The account is aimed at senior undergraduate and graduate students, teachers and research workers in animal behaviour, population genetics and evolutionary biology. The book will also be of interest to mathematicians and game theorists; the mathematics has been largely confined to appendixes so that the main text may be easily followed by biologists.
This book is aimed at anyone with a serious interest in ecology. Ecological models of two kinds are dealt with: mathematical models of a strategic kind aimed at an understanding of the general properties of ecosystems and laboratory models designed with the same aim in view. The mathematical and experimental models illuminate one another. A strength of the account is that although there is a good deal of mathematics, Professor Maynard Smith has concentrated on making clear the assumptions behind the mathematics and the conclusions to be drawn. Proofs and derivations have been omitted as far as possible. The book is therefore comprehensible to anyone with a minimal familiarity with mathematical notation. This book was written in the twin convictions that ecology will not come of age until it has a sound theoretical basis and there is a long way to go before that state of affairs is reached.
Why are animal signals reliable? This is the central problem for evolutionary biologists interested in signals. Of course, not all signals are reliable; but most are, otherwise receivers of signals wo
Over the history of life there have been several major changes in the way genetic information is organized and transmitted from one generation to the next. These transitions include the origin of li
