The histories of Europe and Africa are closely intertwined. At times, this closeness has been emphasized, at other times, suppressed and denied. Since the nineteenth century, European imperial powers have carved up the continent of Africa among themselves, drawing borders and charting shorelines; in the process, inventing Africa. This was a project anchored in ancient Greek and Roman representations of Africa. For Italy, colonialism in Africa was a matter of consolidating its project of national unification, nominally completed in 1870 with the capture of Rome. By asserting its position as an imperial power, the young nation of Italy hoped to join the club of European nation-states and, in so doing, be rid of the perception that it was a country somewhere in between Europe and Africa. Yet, Italy's colonial endeavour in Africa was also a project with deep historical meaning. Italy posed its imperial project in Africa as a national return to territory which was rightfully Italian. Italia
Lois Lane knows that Superman can fly, but she does not know that Clark Kent can fly. How can that be, given that Superman and Clark are one and the same? To answer this question, Frege famously distinguished the reference of a name (the thing it is a name of) from what he called its 'sense' or 'mode of presentation'. The sense was meant to capture our (necessarily limited) perspective on reference and to explain the difference in 'cognitive value' between "Superman can fly" and "Clark can fly". Frege's distinction has been widely discussed in the last century, but much about it remains unclear. In this collection, Richard Kimberly Heck, one of the world's foremost experts on Frege's philosophy, distinguishes three aspects of Frege's famous 'puzzle' and explores the connections between them. Their wide-ranging discussion touches on issues in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, the history of analytic philosophy, and meta-philosophy. Heck argues that, while
Whether due to Donald Trump, Brexit, or the rise of populism, many are increasingly questioning the value of democracy. Complaints of ignorant voters, irrational public debate, and disconnected politicians have led some to suggest that democracies are destined to make bad decisions, and to propose alternatives. In Intelligent Democracy, political theorist Jonathan Benson rejects this new democratic scepticism. He argues that democracies can make effective use of knowledge, engage in experimentation, utilise diversity, and motivate decisions towards the common good-and that they can do all these things better than their rivals. Benson pleads that we value democracy, not only because it treats us all equally, but because it is intelligent. At the core of the book is the first systemic account of democracy's epistemic value. While it is common to focus on the faults of any one democratic body, Benson argues that democracy represents a much broader network of institutions which work togeth
