It is a settled rule of international law that a State may not rely on the provisions of its 'internal law' as justification for failing to comply with international obligations. However, the judiciaries of most countries, including those with a high record of compliance with international norms, have increasingly felt the need to preserve the area of fundamental principles, where the State's inclination to retain full sovereignty seems to act as an unbreakable 'counter-limit' to the limitations deriving from international law. This volume explores this trend by adopting a comparative perspective, addressing the question of how conflicts between international law and national fundamental principles are dealt with and resolved within a specific legal system. The contributing authors identify common tendencies and fundamental differences in the approaches and evaluate the implications of this practice for the future of the principle of supremacy of international law.
In this book, James R. Maxeiner takes on the challenge of demonstrating that historically American law makers did consider a statutory methodology as part of formulating laws. In the nineteenth century, when the people wanted laws they could understand, lawyers inflicted judge-made, statute-destroying, common law on them. Maxeiner offers the cure for common law, in the form of sensible statute law. Building on this historical evidence, Maxeiner shows how rule-making in civil law jurisdictions in other countries makes for a far more equitable legal system. Sensible statute laws fit together: one statute governs, as opposed to several laws that even lawyers have trouble disentangling. In a statute law system, lawmakers make laws for the common good in sensible procedures, and judges apply sensible laws and do not make them. This book shows how such a system works in Germany and how it would be a solution for the American legal system as well.
