Rethinking Western Approaches to Counter-Insurgency ─ Moving Beyond the Post-Colonial Conflict

This book critically examines the Western approach to counter-insurgency in the post-colonial era and offers a series of recommendations for its shortfalls.

The author argues that current approaches to countering insurgency rely too heavily on conflicts from the post-World War II years of waning colonialism. Those campaigns – in Malaya, Algeria, Philippines (Huk Rebellion), Vietnam, Aden, and Kenya, among others – are now a half-century distant but are still the cases on which the United States, British, Australian, and other militaries build their guidance for dealing with insurgent threats much changed from those of the Cold War years. Expectations of these nations’ populations regarding the use of force have likewise evolved. This book addresses this problem by offering observations, analysis, and recommendations drawn from more recent and relevant campaigns.

The Western powers contesting the above older conflicts controlled still-in-place colonial governments (Malaya, Algeria, Aden, Kenya) or benefited from cooperative if not always able leaderships (Philippines and Vietnam). They forcibly resettled large segments of populations (Malaya, Vietnam) and relied on force to an extent no longer acceptable to liberal democracies’ citizens in the early 21st century. This book considers eight post-colonial conflicts in which the counterinsurgents attained or continue to demonstrate considerable progress toward their objectives. All offer insights more applicable to counterinsurgency today and in the years to come than do those more distantly past. Together, these case studies span the globe and each shares the characteristic of having achieved notable success when taking on enterprises better known for disaster and disappointment. Nine red herrings resulting from these analyses challenge entrenched beliefs while serving as the impetus for recommended change. Several on the list continue to be foci of heated debate, while others reject presumed truths given little thought thanks to their previously uncontested acceptance.

This book will be of much interest to students of counter-insurgencies, military and strategic studies, security studies and IR in general.

Russell W. Glenn is Senior Lecturer in military operations and national security studies at The Australian National University, Canberra. He has a PhD in American history from the University of Kansas.