Warlords—Strong-Arm Brokers in Weak States

Prompted by reflection on enduring warlordism under the auspices of of the Karzai government in occupied Afghanistan, Marten (political science, Barnard College) provides a comparative examination of recent cases of state leader (foreign and domestic) responses to warlords (or "local power brokers" in Washington euphemism) in order to theorize the relationship between states, sovereignty, warlords, and stability and security in the contemporary world order. Defining (modern) warlords as "individuals who control small pieces of territory using a combination of force and patronage," usually in weak states, she argues that warlords in contemporary times of universal sovereignty only arise in situations where they are at least tacitly protected and supported by states, having become adept at manipulating weak state structures and governed by incentives to continue warlordism, rather than seeking to build genuine state sovereignty. She supports her argument through analysis of four case studies: British and later independent Pakistani acceptance of warlordism in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, contrasting post-Soviet Georgian policies towards warlords under Presidents Shevardnadze and Saakashvili, Russian support for Ramzan Kadyrov in Chechnya, and US-supported Sunni warlords in occupied Iraq. Annotation c2012 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)