The Great Shelby HolmesSherlock Holmes gets a fun, sweet twist with two irresistible young heroes and black & white illustrations throughout, in this middle grade debut from internationally bestselling YA author Elizabeth Eulberg.Shelby Holmes is not your average sixth grader. She's nine years old, barely four feet tall, and the best detective her Harlem neighborhood has ever seen-always using logic and a bit of pluck (which yes, some might call “bossiness”) to solve the toughest crimes.When eleven-year-old John Watson moves downstairs, Shelby finds something that's eluded her up till now: a friend. The easy-going John isn't sure of what to make of Shelby, but he soon finds himself her most-trusted (read: only) partner in a dog-napping case that'll take both their talents to crack.The Great Shelby Holmes Meets Her MatchAcclaimed author Elizabeth Eulberg continues her hilarious middle-grade twist on Sherlock Holmes as detective duo Shelby and Watson face a culprit who might be able
Lois Lane knows that Superman can fly, but she does not know that Clark Kent can fly. How can that be, given that Superman and Clark are one and the same? To answer this question, Frege famously distinguished the reference of a name (the thing it is a name of) from what he called its 'sense' or 'mode of presentation'. The sense was meant to capture our (necessarily limited) perspective on reference and to explain the difference in 'cognitive value' between "Superman can fly" and "Clark can fly". Frege's distinction has been widely discussed in the last century, but much about it remains unclear. In this collection, Richard Kimberly Heck, one of the world's foremost experts on Frege's philosophy, distinguishes three aspects of Frege's famous 'puzzle' and explores the connections between them. Their wide-ranging discussion touches on issues in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, the history of analytic philosophy, and meta-philosophy. Heck argues that, while
This Element discusses the problem of mathematical knowledge, and its broader philosophical ramifications. It argues that the challenge to explain the (defeasible) justification of our mathematical beliefs ('the justificatory challenge'), arises insofar as disagreement over axioms bottoms out in disagreement over intuitions. And it argues that the challenge to explain their reliability ('the reliability challenge'), arises to the extent that we could have easily had different beliefs. The Element shows that mathematical facts are not, in general, empirically accessible, contra Quine, and that they cannot be dispensed with, contra Field. However, it argues that they might be so plentiful that our knowledge of them is unmysterious. The Element concludes with a complementary 'pluralism' about modality, logic and normative theory, highlighting its surprising implications. Metaphysically, pluralism engenders a kind of perspectivalism and indeterminacy. Methodologically, it vindicates Carnap
Personalist leaders, such as Russia's Vladimir Putin, Belarus's Alexander Lukashenko or Venezuela's Nicol嫳 Maduro, are increasingly prominent players in the international landscape; their motivations and policies, however, are poorly understood. The regimes they lead are difficult to examine, mostly because of their most defining feature-an inordinate concentration of power in the hands of one single individual. Yet, personalist leaders do not rule alone, even if they do not always govern through institutional channels. How do personalist regimes really work? How do their rulers acquire and maintain personal control? How does contemporary personal rule differ from how it was practised during the Cold War? These are the key questions addressed in Personalism and Personalist Regimes, which offers a systematic examination of the logic of personalism, or personalist rule, tackling comprehensively the study of personalist leaders and personalist regimes. The book is underpinned by a theoret
Star Magic is the healing modality for healers or anyone wanting to explore their own YOU-Niverse and unleash their full human potential. Working at a level of super-consciousness, by harnessing extra
Mathematics and logic present crucial cases in deciding whether the world is of our making or whether some form of realism is true. Edmund Husserl, who was initially a mathematician, discusses this general question extensively, but although his views influenced the Dutch intuitionists and were taken very seriously by Gödel, they have not been widely appreciated among analytical philosophers. In this book Robert Tragesser sets out to determine the conditions under which a realist ontology of mathematics and logic might be justified, taking as his starting point Husserl's treatment of these metaphysical problems. He does not aim primarily at an exposition of Husserl's phenomenology, although many of the central claims of phenomenology are clarified here. Rather he exploits its ideas and methods to show how they can contribute to answering Michael Dummet's question 'Realism or Anti-Realism?'. In doing so he makes a challenging and provocative contribution to the debate.
Is what could have happened but never did as real as what did happen? What did happen, but isn't happening now, happened at another time. Analogously, one can say that what could have happened happens in another possible world. Whatever their views about the reality of such things as possible worlds, philosophers need to take this analogy seriously. Adriane Rini and Max Cresswell exhibit, in an easy step-by-step manner, the logical structure of temporal and modal discourse, and show that every temporal construction has an exact parallel that requires a language that can refer to worlds, and vice versa. They make precise, in a way which can be articulated and tested, the claim that the parallel is at work behind even ordinary talk about time and modality. The book gives metaphysicians a sturdy framework for the investigation of time and modality - one that does not presuppose any particular metaphysical view.
This classic introduction to the main areas of mathematical logic provides the basis for a first graduate course in the subject. It embodies the viewpoint that mathematical logic is not a collection o
This is a first course in propositional modal logic, suitable for mathematicians, computer scientists and philosophers. Emphasis is placed on semantic aspects, in the form of labelled transition structures, rather than on proof theory. The book covers all the basic material - propositional languages, semantics and correspondence results, proof systems and completeness results - as well as some topics not usually covered in a modal logic course. It is written from a mathematical standpoint. To help the reader, the material is covered in short chapters, each concentrating on one topic. These are arranged into five parts, each with a common theme. An important feature of the book is the many exercises and an extensive set of solutions is provided.
This is a first course in propositional modal logic, suitable for mathematicians, computer scientists and philosophers. Emphasis is placed on semantic aspects, in the form of labelled transition structures, rather than on proof theory. The book covers all the basic material - propositional languages, semantics and correspondence results, proof systems and completeness results - as well as some topics not usually covered in a modal logic course. It is written from a mathematical standpoint. To help the reader, the material is covered in short chapters, each concentrating on one topic. These are arranged into five parts, each with a common theme. An important feature of the book is the many exercises and an extensive set of solutions is provided.
This textbook, now in its sixth edition, continues to be straightforward and easy-to-read, presenting the principles of PLCs while not tying itself to one manufacturer or another. Extensive examples a
The mathematical proof is the most important form of justification in mathematics. It is not, however, the only kind of justification for mathematical propositions. The existence of other forms, some
In this book Frederic Schick develops his challenge to standard decision theory. He argues that talk of the beliefs and desires of an agent is not sufficient to explain choices. To account for a given choice we need to take into consideration how the agent understands the problem, how he sees in a selective way the options open to him. The author applies his new logic to a host of common human predicaments. Why do people in choice experiments act so often against expectations? Why do people cooperate in situations where textbook logic predicts that they won't? What exactly is weakness of will? What are people reporting when they say their lives have no meaning for them? This book questions the foundations of technical and philosophical decision theory and will appeal to all those who work in that field, be they philosophers, economists and psychologists.
Much contemporary philosophical debate centres on the topics of logic, thought and language, and on the connections between these topics. This collection of articles is based on the Royal Institute of Philosophy's annual lecture series for 2000–2001. Its contributors include a number of those working at the forefront of the field, and in their papers they reflect their own current pre-occupations. As such, the volume will be of interest to all philosophers, whether their own work is within the areas of language and thought or not.
In this book Frederic Schick develops his challenge to standard decision theory. He argues that talk of the beliefs and desires of an agent is not sufficient to explain choices. To account for a given choice we need to take into consideration how the agent understands the problem, how he sees in a selective way the options open to him. The author applies his new logic to a host of common human predicaments. Why do people in choice experiments act so often against expectations? Why do people cooperate in situations where textbook logic predicts that they won't? What exactly is weakness of will? What are people reporting when they say their lives have no meaning for them? This book questions the foundations of technical and philosophical decision theory and will appeal to all those who work in that field, be they philosophers, economists and psychologists.
Here is an introductory textbook which is designed to be useful not only to intending logicians but also to mathematicians in general. Based on Dr Hamilton's lectures to third and fourth year undergraduate mathematicians at the University of Stirling it has been written to introduce student or professional mathematicians, whose background need cover no more than a typical first year undergraduate mathematics course, to the techniques and principal results of mathematical logic. In presenting the subject matter without bias towards particular aspects, applications or developments, an attempt has been made to place it in the context of mathematics and to emphasise the relevance of logic to the mathematician. Starting at an elementart level, the text progresses from informal discussion to the precise description and use of formal mathematical and logical systems. The early chapters cover propositional and predicate calculus. The later chapters deal with Gödel's theorem on the incompletene
Kant said that logic had not had to take a single step forward since Aristotle, but German Idealists in the following generation made concerted efforts to re-think the logical foundations of philosophy. In this book, Jacob McNulty offers a new interpretation of Hegel's Logic, the key work of his philosophical system. McNulty shows that Hegel is responding to a perennial problem in the history and philosophy of logic: the logocentric predicament. In Hegel, we find an answer to a question so basic that it cannot be posed without risking incoherence: what is the justification for logic? How can one justify logic without already relying upon it? The answer takes the form of re-thinking the role of metaphysics in philosophy, so that logic assumes a new position as derivative rather than primary. This important book will appeal to a wide range of readers in Hegel studies and beyond.
2 called in question, then naturally no fact, science, could be presupposed. Thus Plato was set on the path to the pure idea. Not gathered from the de facto sciences but formative of pure norms, his d
In The Not-Two, Lorenzo Chiesa examines the treatment of logic and God in Lacan's later work. Chiesa draws for the most part from Lacan's Seminars of the early 1970s, as they revolve around the axiom
Learning Logic interactive tutorials provide students with additional review and practice with examples and exercises not found in the text. The program contains more than 11,000 sound files along wit
